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Abstract 24 
In this paper, a mathematical model for conflict resolution among a diverse set of agricultural water users in 25 
Golestan province, Iran, is developed. Given the bi-level nature of the distribution of power in the current problem, 26 
a combination of Leader–Follower game and Nash–Harsanyi bargaining solution method is employed to find 27 
optimal water and crop area allocations. The Golestan Regional Water Authority is the leader in this setting, 28 
controlling the total water allocations; and the agricultural sectors are the followers, competing over the allocated 29 
water. Two objectives for the leader are (i) maximizing profits, and (ii) maximizing share of green water in total 30 
agricultural production through selecting more efficient crop patterns. The followers’ objective is merely 31 
maximizing obtained benefits for the selected crop patterns. Virtual water concept is also factored into the related 32 
objective functions, and the water allocation problem is solved considering spatio-temporal crop pattern along 33 
with a dynamic water pricing system. This involves using a hybrid optimization structure as a new approach to 34 
solving two level optimization problems. The results show that the leader’s income is independent of total water 35 
allocation and is only affected by crop pattern and crop area, two factors which drive water price too. The 36 
followers’ benefit also depends on crop pattern and crop area, as they influence the crop yield, cost and water 37 
price. Finally, green water plays a key role in selecting the optimal crop pattern and crop area. 38 
 39 
Keywords: Green water; Leader-followers Game; Agricultural water allocation; Agricultural benefit; Nash 40 
bargaining model; NSGA-II multi-objective optimization model 41 
 42 
 43 
 44 
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 1. Introduction 45 
Water shortage is a global problem, which is more pronounced in arid and semi-arid areas (Sadegh et al. 2010). 46 
While prolonged droughts, change in ratio of snow to rain, global warming, and increased number of dry days all 47 
played some role in this issue, population growth and economic development and subsequent rise in water demand 48 
aggravate the problem (AghaKouchak, 2015). Agricultural sector as the largest consumer of water around the 49 
globe endures highest socio-economical loss from water scarcity, manifested in the reduction of crop yield 50 
(Khanjari Sadati et al., 2014). Su et al. (2014) introduced “Virtual Water Trade” as an effective strategy to improve 51 
sustainable use of water resources, which can also be employed as a strong tool to effectively allocate water 52 
resources at regional scales. The concept of virtual water was originally introduced by Allan (1998) to account 53 
for the water consumed in food production, and recently any product in general, which is in turn traded in regional 54 
and global markets. The concept of  virtual water and other related fields such as virtual water trade, virtual water 55 
flow and water footprint have been extensively studied in the literature (Yang and Zehnder, 2007; Liu and 56 
Savenije, 2008; Verma et al., 2009; Faramarzi et al., 2010; Velázquez et al., 2011; Konar et al., 2013; Chen and 57 
Chen, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014; Su et al., 2014;  Zhang et al., 2016; Ababaei and Etedali, 2017; Srinivasan et al., 58 
2017; Wang et al, 2017). Different methods have also been applied to optimize the water-food nexus (e.g. 59 
Faramarzi et al., 2010; Su et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2016). 60 
Increasing water consumption and withdrawal due to population and economic growth, as well as increasing 61 
awareness for environmental protection have led to intense competition over the already stressed water resources 62 
(Sadegh and Kerachian, 2011; Taher Kahil et al. 2015). This highlights the significant role of governmental 63 
entities and watershed managers as decision-makers on how to allocate water (C. Johansson et al., 2002; O. Orubu, 64 
2006; Hanak and Lund, 2012; Farhadi et al. 2016; Hu et al. 2016). The relationships between different water users 65 
can be effectively defined within the framework of Non-Cooperative game theory models. In this type of games, 66 
the interactions between players (stakeholders) are based on their strategic goals (Carraro et al., 2007). When 67 
players make decisions in different levels (power layers), a specific non-cooperative game, namely “leader-68 
follower” or “Stackelberg” game can be applied (Tharakunnel et al. 2009, Jorgensen et.al 2010, Safari et al. 2013, 69 
Kicsiny et al. 2014, Taher Kahil et al. 2015, Hu et al. 2016). The application of leader-follower game in the field 70 
of optimal water allocation was first considered by Barbier and Bhaduri (2003, 2008). Ever since, the leader-71 
follower game has been used in water resources management literature. For example, Bhaduri and Liebe (2012) 72 
evaluated the scope and sustainability of cooperation between two countries with the common basin using a 73 
Stackelberg static model, and Safari et al. (2013) developed a model for optimal water allocation to various users 74 
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based on a leader-follower game. In the latter study, Iran Water Resources Company was considered as the leader 75 
and three water consumers as followers. Being of a single-objective nature, they used genetic algorithm to solve 76 
the water allocation model. Another example is the conjunctive allocation of surface- and ground-water resources 77 
by Parsapour-Moghaddam et al. 2015, using a single-player game with non-cooperative behavior by consumers 78 
of surface- and ground-water resources.  79 
Hu et al. (2016), by presenting a two-level optimization model, introduced the basin executives as upper-level 80 
and farmers as lower-level decision makers. They converted the multiple objectives of their study into a weighted 81 
single objective model and solved it by the weighted-sum method. Zhang et al. (2016) presented an optimization 82 
model based on the concept of virtual water to increase the productivity of agricultural water consumption for 83 
different scenarios. The objective function used in their research is to minimize the blue water consumption. The 84 
impact of green water, as well as the possibility of intervention by the government and watershed authorities in 85 
the water allocation process in the region are, however, not considered. In another study, Galan-Martin et al. 86 
(2016) developed a multi-objective optimization model (objectives including sustainable food production and 87 
environmental protection) and solved it by applying the epsilon constraint method, without any regard for the role 88 
of the state and the watershed administrators. Furthermore, researchers such as Chen et al. (2017) used leader-89 
follower models in the field of water pollution. They presented a bi-level interaction model in which the 90 
environmental sector and water users are defined as the upper- and lower-level decision makers, respectively. By 91 
comparing this model with one-level models, they noted the significant performance of two-level models.  92 
While significant strides have been made in this field, the impact of virtual water trade has not yet been 93 
considered, to the best of authors’ knowledge, in a leader-follower game framework to allocate water to consumers 94 
and resolve potential conflicts. Also most models in the literature are either single-objective or are converted into 95 
single objective form (weighted average of multiple objectives). In the model presented in this study, the leader 96 
has two objective functions, namely maximizing profits and maximizing share of green water in agricultural 97 
production, and the proposed method forms a Pareto front between the two objective functions. Strategic planning 98 
for employing virtual water to reduce crop water demands in joint groundwater–reservoir irrigation systems is 99 
also not fully explored, which we will address in this paper. Moreover, we define water price as a dynamic 100 
variable, which is vital to preventing a surge in cultivation area and water demand, and achieve self-sufficiency 101 
in crop production. Regional self-sufficiency is defined as a specific level of crop production that can supply the 102 
annual consumption for that crop in the region. The concept depends on population, crop yield and crop demand 103 
per capita.  104 
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In the current research, a two-level optimization model is developed with the presence of executive managers 105 
in top-level and the agricultural sectors in low-level as leader and followers, respectively. The leader's objective 106 
functions are (i) maximizing the profit gained from selling water to the followers, and (ii) maximizing ratio of 107 
“green water to total water” consumption through strategic planning and crop selection. The followers’ objective 108 
functions are to maximize their benefits through adopting different crop patterns. To prevent intensive increase in 109 
cultivation area for some crops and to ensure self-sufficiency in crop production, the model is designed to adapt 110 
water price dynamically in different sectors for each crop. For solving the proposed optimization model, a multi-111 
objective genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) approach is combined with an internal GA optimization model that 112 
maximizes the benefit of the followers. In the following sections, the proposed methodology, results, discussions 113 
and conclusions are discussed. 114 
2. Methodology 115 
The purpose of this study is to optimize agricultural water allocation, while satisfying the goals of basin’s 116 
executive manager with superior power over the agricultural sectors in the decision making process. Two defined 117 
objectives for the basin manager are (i) maximizing the profit gained from selling water to agricultural sectors, 118 
and (ii) maximizing the ratio of “green water to total water” consumption through selecting more efficient crop 119 
patterns in different sectors (three sectors in this study). Both objectives are affected by the crop pattern and the 120 
crop cultivation area. In our model, 10 crops that maximize the leader’s objective functions out of 16 crops are 121 
chosen to be planted, which may vary in different sectors. Selection of these 10 crops must guarantee maximum 122 
benefit for each of the three sectors (followers). Furthermore, by maximizing the ratio of “green water to total 123 
water” consumption, crop per drop productivity would improve. It can lead to increasing cultivation area and 124 
consequently yielding higher profit. 125 
Another parameter that has a key role in determining the objective values of the leader and followers is the 126 
price of water. In the proposed methodology, the price of water is considered as function of the cultivation area 127 
for each crop, such that minimum water price is associated with the cultivation area and pattern that assure self-128 
sufficiency in each sector. The so-called ideal cultivation area in this study depends on population, crop yield and 129 
crop demand per capita in each sector. Farmers that choose to diverge from the ideal cultivation area, for any 130 
reason like crops price, yield, etc., are penalized by the leader through higher water price. Therefore, the water 131 
price for each crop is a function of cultivation area of that specific crop and can vary dynamically in different 132 
sectors for each crop. 133 
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Considering the multi-level nature of the problem at hand, with the basin administrator (leader) in a higher 134 
level than agricultural sectors (followers), it is logical to apply a non-cooperative leader-follower game to model 135 
the system. To resolve the related optimization problem, a combined genetic algorithm (GA) structure is applied. 136 
While an internal GA optimizes the objective of followers, a multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) as an 137 
outer loop, optimizes the leader’s objectives.  138 
In non-cooperative single leader-multi followers game, the followers decide simultaneously for their movement 139 
without any knowledge about each other’s strategies, and based solely on the leader’s total water allocation to the 140 
system and their perception of other players’ behaviour. The objective function of the followers is defined based 141 
on non-symmetric Nash-Harsanyi function (Harsanyi and selten, 1972), in which each follower’s function takes 142 
a power proportional to its influence in the bargaining process. In this study, it is assumed that the more population 143 
the sectors (followers) have, the more powerful they are in bargaining. Therefore, to calculate each sector’s power 144 
factor, its population is divided by the total population of all sectors.  145 
The allocated water to each of the three sectors are the leader’s decision variables, while the follower’s decision 146 
variables include cultivation area coefficient for each crop, as well as crop patterns in the three sectors. There are 147 
4 and 6 types of dominant crops for winter and summer, respectively, and hence the number of possible crop 148 
patterns among 16 suitable crops for each sector is equal to 2,940. 149 
In each iteration, the internal GA structure (for the followers) randomly chooses three crop patterns among the 150 
2,940 alternatives including 10 crops for each sector. Then it randomly selects 30 cultivation area coefficients as 151 
the followers’ decision variables. Therefore, the total number of followers’ decision variables is 33. It is also 152 
assumed that the cultivation area for a given crop is calculated by the multiplication of the total allocated water to 153 
each sector (the leader’s decision variables) by the crop’s cultivation area coefficient (Safari et al., 2014). By 154 
solving the model, a Pareto front curve with various solution points is formed. Fig. 1 shows the different steps for 155 
modelling the proposed methodology. The multi-objective optimization model is formulated as:  156 
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Where X is allocated water to each sector (MCM), AC is allocation coefficient and r is water price for each crop 158 
at each sector ($), respectively. Also y is crop yield (ton per hectare), VWCblue is blue virtual water content (m3/kg) 159 
and VWCgreen is green virtual water content (m3/kg), respectively. i and c are indices for sectors and crops, 160 
respectively. In equations (1) and (2), f (1) is the benefit function ($) and f (2) is the green water rate function. The 161 
objective functions are subjected to the following constraints: 162 
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 163 
Where Area is cultivation area (hectares), T.A.W is total available water (MCM), Bf is followers' benefit (million 164 
dollars) and ω denotes followers' power coefficient. 165 
 166 
2.1. The NSGA-II Multiobjective Optimization Model 167 
Non-Dominant Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-II) is a powerful optimization algorithm, proposed by Deb 168 
et al. (2002). This algorithm, which solves multi-objective optimization problems, has been widely used in the 169 
literature (Nikoo et al., 2011; Nikoo et al., 2012; Nikoo et al., 2014; Monghasemi et al., 2015; Alizadeh et al., 170 
2017). Fig. S1 (Supplementary Information) explains in details the NSGA-II multi-objective optimization 171 
procedure. 172 
 173 
 174 
 175 
2.2. The Leader – Follower Game 176 
This method was introduced by Von-Stackelberg, as a non-cooperative game in 1934. The hierarchical nature 177 
of decision making in this game necessitates an equilibrium solution concept. In this game, the optimal move of 178 
the leader is subject to existing Nash equilibrium among followers. In other words, the leader is completely aware 179 
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about the followers’ payoff functions before making a decision and can determine the equilibrium in followers’ 180 
game. Similarly, for every leader’s decision, the followers are able to calculate their equilibrium reaction in order 181 
to maximize their individual payoff function (Tharakunnel et al., 2009). The best move by the followers is 182 
associated with the strategy that maximizes their payoff. How to make this best move depends on the leader’s 183 
decision that is clear to all followers, and also the solution method that is assigned by the leader. The followers 184 
can interact with one another based on non-cooperative, or hierarchical, behaviour (Safari et al., 2013). Since the 185 
followers compete over limited resources, they all should make simultaneous decisions without any knowledge 186 
about the others’ moves. In this condition, it is rational that the followers consider one of the bargaining solution 187 
methods like the Nash-bargaining solution method. In this paper, a non-cooperative interaction is proposed among 188 
the followers (agricultural sectors) with different powers in the bargaining process. Therefore, a non-symmetric 189 
Nash-bargaining method can be used to define the followers’ objective functions. Interested readers are referred 190 
to examples S1 and S2 (Supplementary Information) for more details.  191 
 192 
Fig.1 Flowchart of the proposed non-cooperative optimization model for water and crop area allocation 
based on leader-followers game
	193 
	194 
2.3. Non-symmetric Nash-bargaining Solution Method 195 
The symmetry assumption as one of the Nash axioms was criticized by some researchers because different 196 
players may not possess similar negotiating power (Matsumoto and Szidarovszky, 2016). This idea is the 197 
foundation of the non-symmetric Nash-bargaining method (Harsanyi and selten, 1972). The mathematical 198 
representation of this method describes the solution method by introducing a positive power vector ω ω1,	ω2…	199 
ωn , where ω1 +	ω2 + …+	ωn=1, as well as a unique solution function φ (H, d), which is the unique solution for 200 
the following optimization problem:   201 
     1 21 1 2 2. ... nn nMaximize Z f d f d f d
       (8) 
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in which Z is the objective function for the Nash-based problem, f is the payoff function for each follower, and d 203 
is the disagreement payoff vector. 204 
 205 
2.4. Water price function  206 
As mentioned before, in this study water price is a function of crop’s cultivated area. It is assumed that the 207 
minimum water price for each crop is associated with the ideal cultivation area, in which self-sufficiency is met 208 
for each crop. This area is readily computed based on crop yield, crop per capita demand and population in each 209 
region. A second degree polynomial equation can model this function: 210 
2. .wP a Area b Area c                                                        (11) 
 211 
Where Pw is the water price, Area is defined as cultivation area and a, b, c are equation coefficients. 212 
 213 
3. Case study 214 
Performance of the proposed methodology is examined for a specific part of Golestan province in Iran, which 215 
includes an irrigation network named Narmab, supplying water to Minoo Dasht, Azad Shahr and Gonbad Kavoos 216 
cities with maximum cultivable area of 2,000, 7,000 and 10,000 hectares, respectively. The network water demand 217 
is supplied by Narmab reservoir (Fig. 2) and groundwater resources. The dam reservoir with a capacity of 115 218 
MCM was constructed on Narmab River. Groundwater resources, consisting of 1,535 wells, 11 qanats, and 218 219 
springs, also supply water to the agricultural sectors. The related aquifer characteristics such as average aquifer 220 
thickness and storage coefficient are 95 meters and 5%, respectively. The aquifer transmissivity varies between 221 
20 to 2,000 m2 per day, and average annual precipitation is about 500 mm delivered mostly from January to April, 222 
while average potential evapotranspiration is roughly 1000  mm (Golestan Regional Water Authority, 2010). The 223 
current prolonged drought condition has led to significant stress on the water resources in the region, with 224 
maximum extraction from surface and subsurface water resources being about 70 and 50 MCM, respectively. This 225 
research considers two planting seasons (i.e. winter; from November to April and summer; from June to October) 226 
for cultivation, as it is common in the study area with 16 possible crops (summer Rice, summer Cotton, Cucumber, 227 
Soybean, Potato, Tomato, Mung bean, Water Melon, Corn, Pea, Wheat, Onion, Barley, Spinach, Canola and 228 
Kidney bean).   229 
  230 
Fig. 2 Location of the study area in Iran 
 231 
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Fig. 3 schematically presents the relationship between different players in the study area. Agricultural sectors as 232 
Economical Actor push Water Company Authority to access more water through Parliamentary representatives 233 
and other political powers in their region. However, supplying the environmental water demand is a very important 234 
issue for environmental sectors such as Department of Environment and related NGOs. Therefore, they try to 235 
force Water Company Authority not to allocate excess water to the agricultural sectors. Forming some 236 
negotiations between the political and environmental actors is both possible and pragmatic.  237 
 238 
 239 
4. Results and discussion 240 
The proposed methodology, as schematically presented in Fig. 1, starts with gathering data and determining 241 
parameters such as virtual water content (Green and Blue) of different crops in the region and the crop price 242 
functions. The ideal cultivation area, that satisfies self-sufficiency for each crop, is also calculated to then be used 243 
for water pricing. Subsequently, the developed NSGA-II multi-objective optimization model (NSGA-II MO) with 244 
an internal GA optimization structure is executed. The NSGA-II MO model optimizes the leader’s objective 245 
functions, while the internal GA optimizes the followers’ objective functions. NSGA-II MO has three decision 246 
variables namely agricultural water allocation to each of the three agricultural sectors. The population size and 247 
maximum number of generations in NSGA-II are set to 60 and 150, respectively. For internal GA, there exist 33 248 
decision variables including 30 cultivation area coefficients (10 for each of the sectors) and 3 crop patterns (one 249 
for each sector). The GA model assigns 330 chromosomes to the population size and 300 to the maximum number 250 
of generations, with a two point crossover function with fraction value 0.8. Stopping criteria is defined based on 251 
TolFun parameter of 1e-6 for StallGenLimit parameter value 50. For the NSGA-II model, since the number of 252 
decision variables is small (3), it is expected that the number of solution points is small too. So the largest probable 253 
value (1) is assigned to the Pareto fraction parameter to get the maximum number of solution points. Using an 254 
Intel® Core™ i7 and CPU @ 2.4GHz processing system, the model’s run took about 72 hours. By running the 255 
model, a Pareto front that consists of 5 solution points is obtained (Fig. 4). Different solutions on the tradeoff 256 
curve include the optimal values for agricultural water allocation to each sector, crop cultivation area and optimal 257 
crop pattern in each sector. Also the agricultural benefit as a function of the cultivation area and the water price 258 
are calculated. It should be noted that the water price appears both in the leader’s objective function (maximization 259 
of the leader’s income) and the followers’ (maximization of the followers’ benefit). 260 
Fig. 3 Interactions between different  stakeholders (players) in the study area 
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 261 
Fig. 4 Pareto front solution points as a result of running mutiobjective genetic algorithm 
 262 
4.1. Optimal agricultural water allocation 263 
Leader’s decision variable is optimized through maximizing the leader’s income and share of green water in 264 
total agricultural water consumption, as the two leader’s objectives. Fig. 5 shows the values of agricultural water 265 
allocation to the different agricultural sectors for the 5 obtained solution points on the Pareto front. Alternative 3 266 
is associated with the highest total agricultural water allocation, and the highest water allocation to sectors 1, 2 267 
and 3 are related to alternatives 3, 5 and 4, respectively. This is due to the selected crop pattern for each sector. 268 
 269 
                  Fig. 5 Agricultural water allocation to the different agricultural sectors (MCM) 
 270 
 Note that higher agricultural water allocations do not guarantee more profit for the leader (Table 1 and Fig. 271 
5). For example, for alternatives 4 and 5 with agricultural water allocations of 100.11 and 102.72 MCM, 272 
respectively, the obtained incomes are 12.3 million dollars (alternative 4) versus 8.8 million dollars (alternative 273 
5). This is because of the selected crop patterns and the calculated water price, which are assigned to each crop in 274 
different sectors based on its price function.  275 
             276 
Table 1 Values of leader’s objective functions and total water allocation for different alternatives  
 277 
Table 2 presents total crop water consumption (green + blue water) calculated for different alternatives 278 
associated with the values of maximum “green to total water” consumption ratio, agricultural water allocation and 279 
irrigation efficiency (0.5). Comparing the alternatives in terms of “green to total” water consumption, alternative 280 
5 with greater volume of green water is ranked more favourably in comparison with alternative 3, although 281 
alternative 5 consuming more blue water. This stems from the crop patterns with different ability to extract soil 282 
water content (green water) for alternative 5 compared to alternative 3.  283 
 284 
Table 2 Total water consumption for different alternatives 
 285 
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4.2. Optimal crop area 286 
As mentioned earlier, one of the decision variables that is optimized during the optimization process is crop 287 
pattern, which can vary from one agricultural sector to another. Table 3 details the optimal crop patterns for 288 
alternatives 4 and 5 as the least and most water consuming alternatives, respectively. Each crop pattern consists 289 
of 6 summer and 4 winter crops (10 total), which are selected among 9 summer crops and 7 winter crops. In this 290 
table, Spinach as a winter crop is not considered in any of the crop patterns calculated for different sectors.  291 
 292 
Table 3 Optimal crop pattern in different agricultural sectors for alternatives 4 and 5 
 293 
 294 
In addition to crop pattern, the cultivation area for each crop also plays a significant role in water consumption 295 
in each crop pattern. Figs. 6 and 7 separately compare the total cultivation area for the two previously mentioned 296 
alternatives (4 and 5) for summer and winter crops, respectively. 297 
 298 
Fig. 6 Cultivation area comparison for summer crops for two alternatives 4 and 5 
 299 
 300 
Fig. 7 Cultivation area comparison for winter crops for two alternatives 4 and 5 
 301 
 302 
As depicted in Fig. 6, summer crops, excluding watermelon, have greater or similar cultivation area in 303 
alternative 5 as compared to alternative 4. Also among winter crops (Fig. 7), wheat has a greater area for 304 
alternative 4 than alternative 5, but canola with the same monthly water consumption and longer cultivation period 305 
increases water demand (total water consumption, Table 2) for alternative 5. Note that crop area for canola in 306 
alternative 4 and kidney bean in alternative 5 are 56 and 0 hectares, respectively.  307 
Also total cultivation area for alternatives 4 and 5 are 24,018 hectares and 26,442 hectares, respectively (Table 308 
4). Hence, alternative 5 is expected to have a greater amount of water consumption in comparison with alternative 309 
4. As mentioned earlier, maximum cultivable area in sectors 1, 2 and 3 are 2,000, 7,000 and 10,000 hectares, 310 
respectively.  311 
 312 
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Table 4 Cultivation area (hectares) for different agricultural sectors and alternatives 
 313 
4.3. Agricultural benefit 314 
Maximizing agricultural benefit is the objective of each agricultural sector (followers). Since all followers 315 
make their decisions simultaneously, the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining method has been used to formulate their 316 
objective functions. Fig. 8 shows the agricultural benefit for different sectors and alternatives, with alternatives 3 317 
and 4 yielding the most and the least benefits, respectively. Total crop area for alternatives 3 and 4 are 30,245 318 
hectares and 24,018 hectares, respectively (Table 4). In addition to several factors such as crop yield, crop price, 319 
cultivation cost and water price, the total crop area is the main factor in the followers’ benefit. 320 
 321 
Fig. 8 Agricultural benefit (106 $) for different sectors and alternatives 
 322 
Fig. 8 also shows that comparing each sector, the benefit of alternative 3 is greater than that of alternative 4. 323 
For alternatives 1 and 5 with almost the same total cultivation area (Table 4), the difference in benefit is about 12 324 
million dollars, which is attributed to the crop patterns for alternative 1 that have lower water consumption (Table 325 
2), lower costs (cultivation area and water price), and finally greater cultivation area for the more expensive crops 326 
with greater yield (Table 5). 327 
 328 
Table 5 Average agricultural benefit ($/ha) for alternatives 1 and 5 
 329 
 330 
In this table, the parameters “Cost”, “Y.P” and “Water-price” are calculated as weighted average of the 331 
cultivation area for each crop. Also the parameter “Water allocation” (m3/ha) is calculated through dividing the 332 
agricultural water allocation (Table 2) by the total cultivation area (Table 4) for each alternative. 333 
 334 
4.4. Agricultural water price 335 
The agricultural water price for each crop can vary in different sectors for a specific alternative. The water 336 
price depends on the divergence from ideal cultivation area, “the area which satisfies the demand for that crop”, 337 
and the initial prices, which are set to $0.05, $0.0625 and $0.075 for sectors 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The 338 
parameters “ideal area” and “initial price” are used to determine the water price function for each crop. The 339 
13 
 
objective function also calculates the lowest water price associated with the ideal cultivation area for each crop. 340 
As an example, the values of water price in different sectors for alternative 1 are compared to each other in Figs. 341 
9 and 10, for the summer and winter crops, separately. 342 
 343 
Fig. 9 Water price for summer crops in different agricultural sectors based on the results of alternative 1 
 344 
 345 
Fig. 10 Water price for winter crops in different agricultural sectors based on the results of alternative 1 
 346 
Among summer crops (Fig. 9), corn in sector 3 has the highest water price, because of higher divergence from 347 
the ideal cultivation area (greater ratio of cultivation area to the ideal cultivation area, as in Table 6). Fig. 10 348 
depicts the water price for winter crops. Spinach in sector 3 and pea in sector 2 have the highest water prices 349 
among other crops. As illustrated in Table 7, the main reason for this behaviour is divergence from the ideal 350 
cultivation area for these crops. It is worth mentioning that the higher water prices lead to less benefit for the 351 
agricultural sectors, although this can lead to maximizing the leader’s profit as one of its objectives. Hence, it is 352 
rational that the model calculates some cultivation areas with a higher water price.  353 
 354 
Table 6 Ratio of cultivation area to the ideal cultivation area (hectares) for summer crops based on the results 
of alternative 1 
 355 
      356 
Table 7 Ratio of cultivation area to the ideal cultivation area (hectares) for winter crops based on the 
results of alternative 1 
 357 
These results are only comparable to that of Safari et al. (2014) to some extent, given the difference of adopted 358 
methodology. Safari et al. (2014) optimized water price for different users (domestic, industrial and agriculture) 359 
and crops using historical cultivation area for different crops. They, however, did not consider any water price 360 
function for the users and crops. In addition, they did not optimize the cultivation area.  In our study, both water 361 
price function and crop area optimization have been considered. A key strategy to manage cultivation area to serve 362 
regional needs for each crop is to set water price as a function of the ratio of cultivation area to ideal cultivation 363 
area. 364 
 365 
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5. Conclusion 366 
In this study, a non-cooperative game theory model was developed to optimize agricultural water allocation and 367 
crop cultivation area. Considering the bi-level decision making nature of the problem, a Leader – Follower game 368 
was applied with Iran Water Resources Management Company as the leader and agricultural sectors as the 369 
followers. Two defined objective functions for the leader are (i) maximizing profit gained from selling water to 370 
the agricultural sectors, and (ii) maximizing the ratio of “green water to total water” consumption through selecting 371 
the most efficient crop patterns. Since the followers’ behaviour is non-cooperative and they make their decisions 372 
simultaneously, their objective functions, i.e. maximizing benefits for the selected crop patterns, are formulated 373 
based on the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining solution method. The developed optimization model is solved by the 374 
multi-objective genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) approach linked with an internal GA optimization model that 375 
maximizes the benefit of the followers. The proposed methodology is applied to the Narmab irrigation network 376 
in Golestan province in Iran to examine the model’s performance. The results show that the leader’s profit is 377 
affected by crop pattern and crop area as two factors that also influence the agricultural water price. The alternative 378 
with the highest total water consumption is not identical to the one for which the highest blue water was allocated 379 
(Table 2), because the ratio of “green water to total water” consumption (i.e. leader’s second objective) affects 380 
the total water consumption. This ratio plays a significant role in selecting the optimal crop pattern and crop area, 381 
through which it also affects the followers’ benefits. Note that optimal crop pattern and crop area are functions of 382 
crop yield, cost and agricultural water price. Future studies can develop a stochastic model to consider uncertain 383 
parameters such as water availability and green water content (dependant on precipitation). Furthermore, an agent-384 
based model could be developed to account for the role of interactions among agents in determining crop pattern 385 
and area allocation. 386 
387 
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Table 1 Values of leader’s objective functions and total water allocation for different alternatives 502 
Alternative Leader’s Income (106 $) Green-water/total water consumption Total water allocation 
1 11.9 0.361 97.67 
2 11.7 0.363 98.05 
3 10.2 0.371 107.12 
4 12.3 0.340 100.11 
5 8.8 0.411 102.72 
 503 
 504 
Table 2 Total water consumption for different alternatives 505 
Alternative 
Obj.2
* 
Agricultural water 
allocation  (MCM) 
Net irrigation (blue) 
water (MCM) 
Green water 
(MCM) 
Total water 
consumption (MCM) 
1 0.361 97.67 48.83 27.59 76.42 
2 0.363 98.05 49.02 27.94 76.96 
3 0.371 107.12 53.56 31.59 85.15 
4 0.340 100.11 50.06 25.79 75.84 
5 0.411 102.72 51.36 35.84 87.20 
*Obj. 2 is the maximum green water to total water consumption ratio 506 
 507 
Table 3 Optimal crop pattern in different agricultural sectors for alternatives 4 and 5 508 
Alternative 
                                                                                        Crop 
Summer Crops Winter Crops 
R C1 C2 S1 P1 T M W1 C3 P2 W2 O B C4 K 
4 1,2,3 2 3 1,2,3 1 1,3 1,2,3 2,3 1,2 3 1,2,3 1,2 1,2,3 1,3 2 
5 2,3 1,2 3 2,3 1 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2 1,2,3 - 
R: Rice, C1: Cotton, C2: Cucumber, S1: Soybean, P1: Potato, T: Tomato , M: Mung bean , W1: Water Melon ,   C3: 509 
Corn, P2: Pea , W2: Wheat , O: Onion , B: Barley,  C4: Canola , K: Kidney bean 510 
1: Minoo Dasht agricultural sector , 2: Azad Shahr agricultural sector, 3: Gonbad Kavoos agricultural sector 511 
 512 
 513 
 514 
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Table 4 Cultivation area (hectares) for different agricultural sectors and alternatives 515 
Alternative 
Agricultural Sector 1 Agricultural Sector 2 Agricultural Sector 3   
summer crops winter crops summer crops winter crops summer crops winter crops total 
1 1999 1696 4150 6094 5288 6919 26147 
2 1990 1762 3449 4787 4939 8869 25795 
3 1992 2000 4188 6954 5337 9774 30245 
4 1610 1966 3338 3699 5155 8251 24018 
5 1929 1864 3801 6765 4852 7231 26442 
 516 
 517 
Table 5 Average agricultural benefit ($/ha) for alternatives 1 and 5 518 
Alternative Cost*  Y.P* Water-price Water allocation (m3) Water-Cost Benefit 
1 273.72 3961.62 0.11 3735.39 419.30 3268.60 
5 312.50 3387.08 0.08 3884.70 327.29 2747.29 
        *Y, P and Cost are yield (kg/ha), crop price ($/kg) and cultivation cost ($/ha), respectively 519 
 520 
 521 
Table 6 Ratio of cultivation area to the ideal cultivation area (hectares) for summer crops based on the results of 522 
alternative 1 523 
Agricultural Sector 
Crop 
R C1 C2 S1 P1 T M W1 C3 
1 0.43 1.93 0 1.89 1.35 5.48 0 0 9.07 
2 0.29 2.94 2.80 0 0.91 0 0 0.31 5.10 
3 0.20 4.38 1.36 0 0 3.21 3.65 0 11.10 
R: Rice, C1: Cotton, C2: Cucumber, S1: Soybean, P1: Potato, T: Tomato, M: Mung bean, W1: Water Melon,        C3: 524 
Corn  525 
 526 
 527 
 528 
21 
 
Table 7 Ratio of cultivation area to the ideal cultivation area (hectares) for winter crops based on the results 529 
of alternative 1 530 
Agricultural Sector 
Crop 
P2 W2 O B S2 C4 K 
1 6.93 0.85 0 0 0 0.02 3.83 
2 11.86 0.77 0 1.61 0 0.63 0 
3 0 0.67 0 0 6.30 0.16 1.95 
P2: Pea, W2: Wheat, O: Onion, B: Barley, S2: Spinach, C4: Canola, K: Kidney bean 531 
 532 
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Fig. 1 Flowchart of the proposed non-cooperative optimization model for water and crop area allocation based 533 
on leader-followers game 534 
 535 
 536 
 537 
 538 
 539 
 540 
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 552 
 553 
Fig. 2 Location of the study area in Iran 554 
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 560 
 561 
 562 
 563 
 564 
Fig. 3 Interactions between different stakeholders (players) in the study area 565 
 566 
 567 
 568 
  
Agriculture Sectors 
Economical Actors 
  
Parliamentary 
Representatives 
Political Actors
 
Environmental Actors
Department of 
Environment 
 Water Company Authority 
Iranian Environmental 
Non- Government 
Organisations 
City and Country Council 
24 
 
 569 
Fig. 4 Pareto front solution points as a result of running mutiobjective genetic algorithm 570 
 571 
 572 
 573 
Fig. 5 Agricultural water allocation to the different agricultural sectors (MCM) 574 
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 575 
           Fig. 6 Cultivation area comparison for summer crops for two alternatives 4 and 5 576 
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 579 
        Fig. 7 Cultivation area comparison for winter crops for two alternatives 4 and 5 580 
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 585 
Fig. 8 Agricultural benefit (106 $) for different sectors and alternatives 586 
 587 
 588 
Fig. 9 Water price for summer crops in different agricultural sectors based on the results of alternative 1 589 
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Fig. 10 Water price for winter crops in different agricultural sectors based on the results of alternative 1 593 
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